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a research article
World Urbanization Prospects:




This paper proposes to critically examine the United Nations projections on urbanisation.
Both the estimates of current trends based on national data and the method of projec-
tion are evaluated. The theory of mobility transition is used as an alternative hypothesis.
Projections are proposed using a polynomial model and compared to the UN projections,
which are based on a linear model. The conclusion is that UN projections may overesti-
matethe urbanpopulationfortheyear2030byalmostonebillion,or19% inrelativeterm.
The overestimation would be particularly more pronounced for developing countries and
may exceed 30% in Africa, India and Oceania.
1Institut de Recherche pour le D´ eveloppement (IRD), Paris. E-mail: bocquier@dial.prd.fr
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1. Introduction
The United Nations Population Division has been publishing and revising its World Ur-
banisation Prospects since 1991 (the latest being the 2002 revision: United Nations 2002)
and this has become a popular source of data and analysis of the past, current and fu-
ture proportion urban in each country, region or continent of the world. As urban issues
get more attention, notably in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), it is increas-
ingly used as an instrument for projections of some other global trends, such as poverty
(UN-Habitat 2003; World Bank 2003), energy consumption (EIA 2004; IEA 2004), en-
vironment and resources (UNDP et al. 2003), etc. Projections and even estimations, for
recent years, of other global trends cannot afford to do without urbanisation projections,
as they are often a key indicator of global integration. No other organisation than the UN
has been successful in compiling a database on urbanisation that equals the UN database
in scope and quality. An early attempt to offer alternative to the UN database is the
GEOPOLIS database, which is using a common agglomeration (building-blocks density)
and population (10,000 inhabitants threshold) criteria for all countries (Moriconi-Ebrard
1993, 1994). Unfortunately, this database is at present only available up to 1990 and its
procedures have not been recognized by an international body. A more recent alterna-
tive using polygons created from satellite images of night-time lights is offered by the
Gridded Population of the World (GPW) database under construction at the Columbia
University’s Earth Institute’s Center for InternationalEarth Science InformationNetwork
(CIESIN) and available online (Balk et al. 2004). This last approach is promising but the
data on urban agglomerations are not yet available world-wide and may reflect more the
availability of electricity than the actual population size and density.
Since the UN data is largely used and referred to, analysing the historical trends and
projections from this set of data will be more useful to the interested reader and also
to the planner than to refer to not yet internationally agreed alternatives. Nevertheless,
and without questioning the merits of the UN database on urbanisation, it is necessary
to assess its limits. This has already been done through a number of publications since
the inception of the UN method of projection for urban population. Among the most
recent works that build on this literature, B. Cohen (2004) offers the most up-to-date and
concise evaluation of the UN forecasts focusing on less developed countries (LDC) and
is actually summarizing the work published in more details by the National Academy
of Sciences (USA) in a major and recent book addressing various urban issues in LDC
(National Research Council 2003). Another book published at around the same time
focuses on the deﬁnition and measurement problems as regard to urbanisation (Hugo and
Champion2003). Fromthese recentpublications,it appearsthat while acknowledgingthe
importance of the work done by the UN, demographers and geographers are very critical
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about the quality of the national urbanisation estimates and the method of projectionused
by the UN.
What aboutusingnationalestimates ratherthan internationally-agreedestimates? The
UN argues (1997, p160) that though “the quality of the estimates and projections made
is highly dependent on the quality of the basic information permitting the calculation of
the proportion urban” and that “the criteria used to identify urban areas vary from coun-
try to country and may not be consistent even between different data sources within the
same country”, it still relies “on the data produced by national sources that reﬂect the
deﬁnitions and criteria established by national authorities”. This justiﬁcation is based on
UN reports published in the 1960s that concluded that “it is not possible or desirable to
adopt uniform criteria to distinguish urban areas from rural areas”. This opinion will
appear outdated to the 21st century reader: ﬁrst, many attempts have been made since
the 1960s to harmonise databases on urbanisation, at least at a regional level (European
Union, CELADE), precisely to allow comparison across time and space. Maintaining the
same deﬁnitions of urban areas might also enable time comparison for each particular
country. Considering that most urban deﬁnitions are inadequate for analysis, the effort
is now directed towards more ﬂexible deﬁnitions using the building-block areas as the
smallest units of analysis, thus permitting presentation along different criteria depending
on the focus of the analysis (Hugo and Champion 2003). Therefore, the only remain-
ing justiﬁcation for using national deﬁnitions is that the data based on those deﬁnitions
are readily available, whereas more sophisticated deﬁnitions are still to be tested and ap-
proved by national and international entities. That is the main reason why, despite its
inadequacy and all scientiﬁc efforts to remedy it, the UN database will still be used for
many years, unless considerable international effort is directed towards collecting data in
a format that would be suitable for applying more flexible definition of urban areas. This
reason only would sufﬁce to develop a methodology to obtain proper projections using
the currently available UN data based on national definitions.
What about the projection method? Let alone the difﬁcult problem of the availability
of reliable data, and temporarily working with the hypothesis that national deﬁnitions
capture reasonably well the proportion urban, the method of projections used by the UN
sinceits ﬁrst projectionsofurbanpopulationneedsexamination. B. Cohen(2004)showed
– by comparing the 2001 UN report with the previous ones – that the UN projections
for urban population for the year 2000 were systematically biased upward for countries
with low and lower middle level of development (theses results also appear in the NAS
publication: NationalResearch Council2003). Themeanpercentageerrors(MPE)forthe
20-years length of forecast could be as high as 27.2% (South Asian countries), but even
the MPE for the 5-years length of forecast exceeds 3% in countries with low and lower
middle level of development. Actually, even in the latest UN report (2002 revision), the
projection method has implication not only for the projection period 1995-2030, but also
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for the estimation period 1950-1995. Though this is not clearly stated in the report, a
number of LDC did not actually offer data on urbanisation for the 1990s and even for the
1980s and projections had to be made for these two decades. As our analysis will show,
the projection method has an effect on the estimates of the urban population as early as in
1990.
Why should the projectionsbe systematically biased? Why are LDC more affectedby
this bias than more developed countries (MDC)? The ﬁrst part of this paper will demon-
strate that these problems originate mainly in the regression model used in the method of
projection. Are there alternative theories that could help to better hypothesize on urban-
isation trends? The second part of this paper will present a reﬁnement to the theory of
mobility transition and will test its implications on urbanisation projections. An original
method of projection will be considered and its results will be compared to the UN pro-
jections. In this paper, to facilitate comparative reading, we adopt the same vocabulary
and notations as found in the UN reports.
2. An evaluation of the UN projections
The principle of the UN interpolation (starting from 1st July 1950 to the end of the es-
timation period, 1st July 1995) and extrapolation (same principle applies from 1995 to
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n) available (United Nations 2002).
To implement the UN projection model, one needs to know only the total population
and the urban population (or the proportion urban) at different dates. All other quanti-
ties are derived from these. The UN projection model belongs therefore to the class of
endogenous autoregressive projection models. It is not explanatory as no independent,
exogenous variables are introduced in the estimation.
It can be shown that the projection method described above mathematically overes-
timates urban growth. As correctly stated in the UN report, the urban-rural growth dif-
ference “declines as the proportion urban increases because the pool of potential rural-
urban migrants decreases as a fraction of the urban population, while it increases as a
fraction of the rural population” (United Nations 2002, p106). Therefore, the UN has





r in the UN report). This model is “obtained by regressing the initial ob-




:] The projectionof theproportionurbanis carried
out, based on a weighted average of the observed urban-rural growth difference for the
most recent period available in a given country and the hypothetical urban-rural growth
difference” (United Nations 2002, p111).
In practical terms, interpolations at speciﬁc dates from 1955 to 1995 (estimation pe-
riod) are derived from the
r
u
r computed using the intercensal data, as explained above,
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The projection is conducted step by step, by ﬁve-year increment, the estimate for one
projection period being used for the projection of the next.
The implications of such a method are the following:
￿ Because the linear regression model is based on data compiled when the world ur-
ban transition was well on its way (the proportion urban was 45.1% in 1995, with
regions’ estimates ranging from a minimum of 21.9% in Eastern Africa to a max-
imum of 87.4% in Australia/New-Zealand), it does not take into account the true
relation between urban-rural growth difference and the percentage urban at the be-
ginning and at the end of the urban transition from low to high proportion urban.
As noted by an earlier critique (National Research Council 2003, p496),the declin-
ing function has not only the effect of slowing down the urban growth of highly
urbanised countries but it has also the effect of speeding the urbanisation process
of little urbanisedcountries. According to the empirical equation mentionedabove,
one could theoretically have in some countries a 3.76%
r
u
r at the beginning of
the process when initial percentage urban is zero, though we expect from historical
observation of countries with low percentage urban that the
r
u
r be growing pro-
gressively from zero value. This is not however the main problem: historically, the
r
u
r reached higher level than 4% or even 5% in some countries or regions (e.g.
in Melanesia when the
r
u
r was around 6% for an initial 11.5% percentage urban




r to reach 1.16% when the initial population is already 100%
urban, because when all the population is urban the
r
u
r can only be zero or neg-
ative, leading to a decrease in the percentage urban. Very few countries of more
than 2 million inhabitants (the threshold chosen to compute the regression model)
can reach 100% urbanisation so the contradictionis not very likely to arise, but it is
still important to incorporate in the model the trends at the limit. Therefore, with-
out even considering the empirical data, a non-linear model would be more con-
sistent with the mathematical relation between the
r
u
r and the percentage urban.
In addition, considering the empirical data, the model should make provision for
the quasi-stabilisation of urbanisation below 100%, as already observed in some,
mostly developed countries.
￿ Because the modelis uniquelyappliedonall countries, it cannottake accountof the
historical differences in the urban transition from one country to another. Applied
to projections, the model makes the implicit assumption that all countries should
go through the same process of urbanisation as the currently developed countries.
Not only does this assumption appear Western-centred, but as we will see (it is best




oped countries. Therefore, an appropriate model should at least ﬁt differently the
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never been much higher than 3% in developedcountries whereas it could reach 5%
or more in developingcountries. In other words, signiﬁcant urban growth started in
the 18th Century in developed countries in order to reach a 55% proportion urban
in 1950 and have more rapidly progressed in the second half of the 20th century
to reach 75% in 1995. The urbanisation in developing countries, on the contrary,
starting fromless than 10%in 1900,rapidlyreached18% in 1950and 38% in 1995.
2.1 Evidence of non-linearity in the relation between urban-rural growth difference
and the percentage urban
Ideally, we would want to draw historical trends of urbanisation for all countries of the
world since the beginning of ages. No currently available database can offer such long
trends, even for the more developed countries or for the last two centuries only. Actually,
the earliest date at which one can have a reasonablepicture of the urbanisationworldwide
is 1950. Estimates for earlier periods exist but only for Europe (Bairoch 1985; Chandler
1987; de Vries 1984) and China (Chandler 1987; Liang 2001) (for a synthesis on both,
see Woods 2003). It is therefore not easy to demonstrate what should be the form of the
relation between urban-rural growth difference and the percentage urban during the early
stage of the urbanisation process, especially outside Europe.
In ﬁgures 1 to 5, we plotted the trends formed by the urban-rural growth difference,
r
u









regions of the world. The curves read from left to right and the ﬁrst point represents the
year 1955. Subsequent points are deﬁned over ﬁve-year intervals until the year 2030, the
last point on the curve. The projection period is represented for each region by dotted
lines from 1990.
The reason why a linear model was used when the UN started its projection exercise






Ucurve from the 1950s to the 1970s. In absence of deeper historical trends,
a sensible solution was to model the trend across countries at a given time. The different
level of urbanisation at which these countries were captured was supposed to reﬂect the
most likely path the less urbanised countries would follow to reach, one day, the level of
the most urbanised countries.
Now that data are available from the 1950s to the 1980s, and sometimes to the 1990s,





U should still be
ﬁtted. In hardly any region of the world the relation follows a linear downward pattern,
except maybe in Western Africa (Figure 1), South America and Central America (Figure
2). Most patterns from 1955 to 1990 follow an inverted U-curve whether in develop-
http://www.demographic-research.org 203Bocquier: World Urbanization Prospects
Figure 1: Urban-Rural Growth Difference versus Proportion Urban in Africa
(1950-2030,projection period represented by a dotted line; source: UN,
2004)
Figure 2: Urban-Rural Growth Difference versus Proportion Urban in
Caribbean, South and Central America (1950-2030,projection period
represented by a dotted line; source: UN, 2004)
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Figure 3: Urban-Rural Growth Difference versus Proportion Urban in Asia
(1950-2030,projection period represented by a dotted line; source: UN,
2004)
Figure 4: Urban-Rural Growth Difference versus Proportion Urban in Less
Developed Oceania (1950-2030,projection period represented by a
dotted line; source: UN, 2004)
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Figure 5: Urban-Rural Growth Difference versus Proportion Urban in
Developed Regions (1950-2030,projection period represented by a
dotted line; source: UN, 2004)
ing countries (Eastern Africa, Middle Africa, Northern Africa, Caribbean, South-Central
Asia, Melanesia and Micronesia) or in developed countries (Southern Europe and North-
ern Europe). Other regions follow a more ambiguous pattern but almost all have seen the
r
u
r falling sharply from peak values usually attained in the 1950s and 1960s for the LDC
regions, or in the 1970s and 1980s for the MDC regions. Exception to that phenomenon
are foundin Asia: Western Asia, which after a sharp fall in the 1970s,experiencedthe op-
posite trend in the 1980s; South-Eastern Asia experienced a rise in the 1970s and 1980s,
and Eastern Asia in the 1980s, though this can be attributed to China1 only.
Rather intriguingly, some regions, particularly in Africa but also in Oceania, show a
slight increase in the
r
u
r in the 1980s that could be interpreted as a reversal of the overall
downward trend. However, this upward trend is limited and rather reﬂects the use of the
UN model of projection for some countries where data were incomplete prior to 1995.
This shows that the method not only has an effect on the 1995-2030projection period but
also on the later part of the estimation period, i.e. in the 1980s up to 1995, as data on
urbanisation were not readily available for all developing countries.
1The peculiar case of China can be explained by the Cultural Revolution, which forced from the mid-1960s
to the mid-1970s many urbanites to live in rural areas (Liang 2001), but also by changes in the ofﬁcial urban
deﬁnition (United Nations 2002, p18 & 21).
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2.2 Evidence of overestimation in the projection of the proportion urban
We have seen the urbanisation trends in the second half of the 20th century. Do the UN
projections observe the same trends or do they depart signiﬁcantly from the empirical,
historical observations? The easiest way to conﬁrm the latter is to observe the trends
formed by the dotted lines on Figures 1 to 5 for the period 1990-2030. For ease of inter-
pretation and in order to better show the effect of the UN model of projection, we added




Although the graphs show data groupedby world regions, whereas the UN estimation
and projections were done country by country, it is clear that this method of projection
has the effect of:
￿ Reversingthedownwardtrendforthoseregionswhichfellbelowtheregressionline
in 1995. This is particularly visible for developing Oceania and European regions
(Figure 4 and 5), but also for other regions like Middle Africa (Figure 1) or South-
Central Asia (Figure 3). In these regions, the
r
u
r sort of ’bounced’ to reach the
level of the regression line.




at high level for some time before it joins the regression line.
Someotherregions(South-EasternAsia, SouthernAfrica,CentralAmericaandAustralia-
New Zealand) follow patterns that do not ﬁt the above description, but generally, none
of the trends for the projection period 1995-2030 follow the patterns of the estimation
period 1950-1995, with the possible exceptions of Western Africa and Central America.
The Figures make it clear that the UN projections are not prolonginghistorical trends. As
expected – since the UN projection model applies uniformlyto all countries –, all regions
line up against the regression line in the vicinity of 2030.
What are the effects on the projected urbanisation level? The reversal of the down-
ward trend and inﬂation of the
r
u
r have the effect of increasing urban growth mostly in
developing countries, and maintaining urban growth at high level in developed countries.
We then expect the projected proportion urban at the 2030 horizon to be largely overes-
timated. In other words, the UN method of projection is implicitly imposing a unique,
historically dated, MDC-oriented model of urban transition on all countries of the world,
leading to a systematic overestimation of the world urbanisation.
3. In search for an alternative model for projecting urbanisation
Our contention is that projections should be based on the history of urban transition and
take account of the different levels of development across the world. It has been shown
that there is a high correlation between the proportion urban and the level of develop-
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ment, measured either by gross domestic product (GDP) or by the human development
index (HDI) (Davis and Henderson 2003; Njoh 2003; Woods 2003). Though the causal
relationship between urbanisation and development is far from clear, an endogenous pro-
jection model should apply differently depending on the speciﬁc urban history of the
country at stake and should not necessarily lead to a high proportion urban for all coun-
tries or regions of the world.
The theory of mobility transition initiated by W. Zelinsky (1971; 1983)offers an ideal
type of a country which, starting from a low proportion urban and low urban growth,
should go through a development process that leads to high urban growth. At the begin-
ning of the mobility transition, urban growth is generally migration-driven whereas at its
end the contribution of natural growth to the urban to rural growth differential is higher.
At the end of the mobility transition, the country should reach a high proportion urban
and low urban growth, as observed in the developed countries. Graphically, it means that





U should form an inverted U-curve, starting at 0% or so
andﬁnishing maybeat 100%. The mobilitytransitiontheoryrecognisedthat each country
might follow the urban transition at its own pace. This seems to be indeed the case, as
some western countries took more than two centuries to reach their current level of ur-
banisation whereas some other countries experienced the same transition in less than 50
years.
However this theory, is not clear about the effect of the development process on the
actual level of urbanisation that each country should reach at the end of the mobility
transition. It is hypothesizedthat developmentas it is known in the Western world should
expand to the rest of the world so that, at the end of the day, all countries should reach
the same level of urbanisation, close to the level reached in the present MDC. On the
contrary, the empirical evidence of the preceding section shows that the urban transition
mightfollowdifferentpatternsaccordingtothehistoricalperiodit wentthroughandtothe





U has different shapes. Not only the modal point of the curve varies a lot




r seems to converge to zero is different.
We will call this point of convergence the urban saturation point for convenience. It
represents the point where rural and urban areas are growing at the same pace. The term
saturation as employed here does not mean it is an absorbing state where the country or
region is trapped after
r
u
r eventually reaches zero. In the real world of urbanisation,
cases of counterurbanisation (when
r
u
r is less than




r is alternatively greater and smaller than
0) are not uncommon. Our
concept of urban saturation is meant here to identify a theoretical point of convergence
of the urban transition process that can be different from one country to another and that
could possibly correspond to the urban capacity of the economy, which can itself evolve
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over time.
Inthis section,we willstart bygivingtheprincipalcharacteristicsofamodelforurban
projection before proposing a new model of projection based on two key principles: his-
torical perspective and country-based approach. We will then implement the model and
show that it actually ﬁts well the observed urbanisation process of most countries in the
world and offers a quite reasonable alternative to the UN projections, even with imperfect
data. Note that our empirical model of urban transition does not pretend to exhaust the
complexity of Zelinsky’s theoretical model of mobility transition, which is more compre-
hensive in its attempt to integrate the demographic transition theory. However, the model
of urban transition can help testing the validity of some of the hypotheses of the model of
mobility transition regarding the evolution of urbanisation.
3.1 Principle characteristics expected from a projection model for urbanisation
To follow a historical perspective on urban transition, an alternative model of projection
based on macro-data should integrate two new factors: speed of urban transition and
possible urban saturation, or even counterurbanisation as seen in some developed coun-
tries as early as in the 1970s (Champion 1989; 2000). The new models for projection
should rely more on the past, empirically observed trends, and should keep the arbitrary
choice to a minimum. The new projection model should be endogenous, i.e. based on
the available data only, as the UN projection model is. Our objective here is not to offer
a projection model with explanatory power, using a number of exogenous variables (such
as GDP, HDI, etc.) that couldexplainthe proportionurbanand its trend, but to offerbetter
projections using the known quantities only.
The model should take into account that projections do not necessarily converge to-
ward an average behaviour. The model should allow each country or region to follow
its own urban transition, leading to different level of urban saturation. A polynomial of
second degree should ideally conform to the inverted-U shape historically observed up to




















































As for the UN model, the projection will be conducted step by step, by ﬁve-year incre-
ment, the estimate for one projection period being used for the projection of the next.
Before going into the details of the implementation of the polynomial model, we will ex-
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3.2 The underlying mathematics of the urban transition process




r) and the proportionurban (
P
U) plays an importantrole in the UN projec-
tions. As noted in the UN report, the
r
u
r is a difference of rates. As such, it does not take
account of the constraints imposed by the risk pool (the absolute number) in both urban
and rural areas. Using intercensal rates seems perfectly sensible for interpolation because
the census data represent observed boundaries and therefore the interpolation necessarily
lies within the possible. For extrapolation, however, the
r
u
r, which depends largely if
not mostly on migration ﬂows, should ideally be constrained by the actual pool of the
population in the origin and destination areas. As mentioned earlier, the solution found
by the UN is to ﬁnd by way of a regression a hypothetical urban-rural growth difference




r). From our diagnosis this method appears inappropriate




r will not improve the projec-
tion, as long as the
r
u
r for all countries will be used as a basis for projection. Fitting
the data country by country should give much better projections. But we also found that
the projections improve when the difference of growth between urban and rural areas is























































t is the hypothetical absolute
increase in urban areas if the urban areas were to grow at the same rate as the total popu-
lation. We chose
x
u because of its close relation to
r
u









































presses a difference between growth rates,
x
u depends not only on this differential but
also on the total population growth. When the total population grows less, the number
of migrants from the sending area is also diminishing, thus reducing the potential growth
of the receiving area (Keyﬁtz 1980; Rogers 1995). The use of
x
u can also be interpreted
as a control of the capacity of the urban areas to absorb an excess increase in absolute
terms. Our hypothesis is that urban infrastructures at large (housing, health, education,
energy, services) cannot sustain high population growth, whatever the relative difference
of growth between urban and rural area. The capacity of absorption of urban infrastruc-
tures grows at a slower rate than the population and constitutes a limit to urban growth
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that is not captured by the
r
u
r. The projection using
x
u will then be constrained by the
overall population growth and therefore be dependent on (and sensitive to) the projection
of the total population.



























































































































2 are computed for each country
i), historically-based and makes
a minimum assumption about the form of the relation (a polynomial function of second





U). Note that when the theoretical urban


























the limit of 100%), the excess increase
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x is actually greater than 100% (a rare













As the UN data are based on National Deﬁnitions of urbanareas, their quality is subjected
to variations within countries (historical variations) and between countries (geographical
variations). In particular deﬁnitions for early years (1950s or 1960s) are often not consis-
tent with the latest deﬁnitions used. In that case national trends are better ﬁtted using the
most recent estimations. In other instances, UN estimations for the most recent periods
show inconsistencies as some countries did not provide for any valuable estimation of
their urban population for the last observation dates (1990, 1985 or even 1980) thus lead-
ing the UN to supplement with their own estimates. However, these estimates are based
on the method of projection criticised above and can lead to biased results. To avoid any
bias introduced by the UN method of projection, we will only take into consideration the
UN estimations up to the time of the most recent data available at the country level, as
mentioned in the UN report annex. Therefore, the estimation period will vary depending
on the data availability of each country or territory2. However, we made no attempt to
2In this paper, and for ease of presentation, the term ’country’ includes territories (very often islands) that
are not necessarily politically independent but for which the UN gathered speciﬁc data on urbanisation. The
word country in this paper implies no judgment about the legal or other status of a territory.
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harmonise the deﬁnition of urban areas, neither historically nor geographically.
Despite the deﬁnitional problem and contrary to our initial belief, the polynomial
model works much better than expected at the country level. Our fear was that by using
a country-speciﬁc model we would end up with a lot more inconsistencies due to the
varying quality of the data. If it were so, we would have to resort to a region-based
model, e.g. by grouping countries in homogenous area of development. Instead, most
countries follow a typical inverted U-curve as hypothesized at the beginning of this study






r, the polynomial form imposed in the model produces much better ﬁt of
historical trends than expected3.
The procedure to come out with the best possible ﬁt and projection is as follows:
1. Fit the polynomial model on all countries for the estimation period, i.e. from 1950
to the latest date when an estimate is available on the basis of available national
data – the estimation period varies from one country to the other.
2. Compute the projected urban populationand other necessary indicators for the next
ﬁve-year interval.
3. Compute the same for the next ﬁve-year interval using previous projections up to
2030, excluding countries that reach 100% urban by projection.
4. Identify the outliers, i.e. the countries for which the parameter
￿
2 in the model is
positive (U-curve instead of the expected inverted U-curve).
5. Examine the pattern of urban growth for the identiﬁed outliers and identify the
possible country-speciﬁc (historical) outliers in the estimation of urban population.
This is easily done by identifying the early periods’ estimations (generally in the
1950s and 1960s) that inﬂuence most the unexpected ﬁt, although some bad ﬁt can
also be caused by recent estimation (e.g. for the 1990s or even the 1980s). The
earlier estimates, e.g. for the 1950s or the 1960s, are retained for computation even
if they are not based on national data, so long as the country is not an outlier.
6. Fit the polynomial model on all countries for the estimation period, after excluding
some observation points for the countries identiﬁed as outliers.
7. Do again step 1 to 6 until all possibilities of exclusion of country-speciﬁc observa-
tions are explored.
Countries where all the population is urban at the end of the observation period are
excluded from the projection exercise: Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, Gibraltar, Holy
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See (Vatican), Monaco, Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Nauru. These countries
are all set on small territories or islands, with no possibility of extension, so that their
urbanisation has reached an absorbing state, i.e. these countries are not supposed to gain
rural population at a later stage. Only three small countries or territories, all situated in

















0). Whether these few countries which did
not so far gainany urbanpopulationshouldone dayhave an urbanpopulationis debatable
but no model can be ﬁt for those tiny countries.
The Figure 6 illustrates for some countries– Sweden, Mexico, India, andChina – how











comparison between countries. The Figure also illustrates that the trend projected by the
UN model (dotted curve) greatly departs from the trend projected by our model.
3.4 Corrections imposed on outliers
The Appendix 2 shows the importance of outliers identiﬁed after running the polynomial
model. In this Appendix, the great outlying countries, for which we had to ﬁnd speciﬁc
solutions, are indicated. Other outliers were more easily dealt with and are also listed in
the Appendix 2 along with the solution found to integrate them in the general model. We
were notable to ﬁndany adjustingsolutionfor onlyonesmall Caribbeanisland, Barbados
(less than 270,000 inhabitants in 2000). For this country, we simply replicated the level
of urbanisation attained in 1990, the year of the latest estimate, as the proportion urban
did not vary much before.
Two cases are worth mentioning here. We had to run a speciﬁc model for Nigeria. In
this country,hardlyany data is available, excepttwo unreliablecensuses (1963and 1991),
to support any valuable projection on urbanisation. The projection using the standard
polynomial model on
x
u proved unrealistic (leading to exponential urban growth from
2010: the proportion urban would reach about 80% in 2030 and would still increase




r proved more realistic, but the projections thus obtained should not be taken
as very reliable either and are reported in the tables for the sake of offering a reasonable
estimate for West Africa and for Africa as a whole. Another exception is Aruba Island







2 component. Again, the projection should not be considered as very reliable for this
country.
Other special corrections include correcting the population urban in Kenya and in
Senegal. In Kenya, the proportion urban was grossly overestimated to 34.8% in the 1999
Census report and does not reﬂect the existing core urban population but the local au-
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Figure 6: Urban-Rural Growth Difference (Observed, Polynomial Model and UN
Model) versus Proportion Urban for Sweden, Mexico, India and China
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thorities instead, i.e. with no consideration of the size of the towns and of their limits.
This undocumented change of deﬁnition led the UN to increase the estimates of the level
of urbanisation at earlier dates (1995, 1990 and even 1985). Our correction for Kenya
consisted in estimating the level of urbanisation in 1990 as per the published 1989 Cen-
sus results and in discarding the UN estimates for 1995 and 2000. For Senegal, we used
the latest 2002 Census results (not considered in the UN report) to estimate the level of
urbanisation in 1990, 1995 and 2000, as the previous census was done long ago in 1987.
A last special case is with Colombia. In this country, the estimates for 1980 and
1985 looked inconsistent with the historical trend before 1980 and after 1985. We simply
deleted those two observation points and found projections more compatible with the
estimates for the years 1990 to 2000.
We had to adjust the model for 64 (i.e. 28%) out of 228 countries or territories of the
UN database. The adjusted countries represent 43.2% of the world population en 2000
and China alone 21.0%. The adjustments were important in Southern Africa (affecting
the estimates for 94% of the population of this region), Eastern Asia (86%, represent-
ing China only), South Eastern Asia (77%), Western Africa (73%), Western Asia (62%),
Western Europe (54%), Eastern Africa (36%) and Micronesia (32%). Two third of the
adjustments (representing 30.8% of the world population) involved the removal of some
early estimation of urbanisation, mostly the 1950s and 1960s estimates, i.e. applying
the polynomial model on the most recent data. These corrections originate in absence
of national data (i.e. estimation by the UN), poor quality of national data or in changes
of deﬁnition of urban areas. The adjustments consisted for the remaining one third of
correction cases (representing 12.4% of the world population) in removing the latest es-
timations that appeared inconsistent with historical trends. This is where the adjustments
are the most debatable. We would of course prefer to use recent estimates as they are
supposed to reﬂect better the current level of urbanisation. However the latest estimates
are subjected to deﬁnitional changes as much as the earliest estimates. Kenya is a good
example where a change of deﬁnition led to an unexpectedly high growth in urban ar-
eas. Because the author happened to live in Kenya at the time of writing, he was able
to identify the deﬁnitional problem and make the necessary corrections. But certainly
similar problems may arise for other countries identiﬁed as outliers, though it is not in
the capacity of the author to document them all. For ease of interpretation of the results,
the Appendix 2 is offering a correction score attached to the estimates depending on the
extent of the corrections made on each outlier (score 1 for mild correction to score 5 for
severe correction). A detailed examinationof the countries identiﬁed as outliers is needed
to produce better projection estimates in the future.
Despite a number of outliers, and after some adjustment, the polynomial model ﬁts
quite well 89.5% of all countries, representing 87.6% of the world population, if we in-
clude in those ﬁgures the countries with minor corrections (for which only the early es-
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timates, from 1950 but no later than 1975, were removed), i.e. excluding the serious
outliers with a correction score greater than 2 (see Appendix 2). Despite the variety of
the deﬁnition of urban areas across countries and its occasional change over time in some
countries, the results are certainly conﬁrming the overall validity of the urban transition
model for the estimation period. The complete urban projections up to 2030, by country
andbyregions,areavailable onthe websitehttp://www.demographic-research.org/,under
the entry for publication 12-9 as an additional ﬁle in Excel format.
4. A comparison of the results obtained through the UN and the poly-
nomial models of projection
To conﬁrm the validity of the model for the projection period, one needs to wait until
estimates are produced for the year 2000 and more on the basis of country data. However
it is possible to anticipate on the validity of the model in two ways, following the method
proposed by N. Keyﬁtz (1981):
￿ On past periods, by comparing the discrepancy measured by the Mean Percentage
Error (MPE) between the projections of the urban population obtained from the
polynomial model from truncated data (e.g. 1950-1980) and the urban population
as estimated by the UN (in 2000, for a 20-years projection period). We can then
compare the results with the performance of the UN model over the same period.
To assess this performance, we rely on the estimate of the MPE computed by B.
Cohen (2004) by comparison of the projection made in the 1980 UN report with
the estimates for 2000 made in the 2001 UN report, for 169 countries. For the
sake of comparison with Cohen’s analyses, we also computed the Mean Absolute
Percentage Error (MAPE) measuring the imprecision of the forecasts.
￿ On future period, by comparing the MPE of UN past projections with the Mean
Percentage Difference (MPD) between UN future projections and the projections
obtained from the polynomial model. If the UN model is overestimating the urban
population in the same proportion for past and future forecasts and if the polyno-
mial model better ﬁts the historical trend, then the MPE and the MPD should give
comparable results.
In both ways, we chose a long projection period (20 years) for comparison because the
MPE and MPD might not show large discrepancies for shorter projection period. The
Table 1 shows that the average performance of the polynomial model, with an MPE of
only 1.1%, are quite good considering that no correction for outliers were conductedhere
and that the model is run on only seven observation points by country. However, the
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MAPE is high (27.0%) showing more imprecision than the UN projections (20.6%) 4.
Removing 27 outliers (countries for which the projection of urban population was more
than 1.5 times less or more than the estimation for the year 2000) improves considerably
the precision, the estimate for the whole world becoming almost exact (MPE = 0.0%)
with an imprecision divided by three (MAPE = 9.1%).
Table 1: Mean Percentage Error (MPE) and Mean Absolute Percentage Error
(MAPE) in urban population polynomial projections by comparison
with UN estimate for 2000 by level of development, size of the country
and continent
MPE MAPE
Major Area or region 1980-2000 1980-2000 Number of
(20-year projection) (20-year projection) countries
￿
WORLD -1.1 % 27.0 % 209
World after eliminating 27 outliers 0.0 % 9.1 % 182
More developed countries 0.4 % 6.0 % 54
Less developed countries -1.4 % 32.1 % 155
LDC after eliminating 24 outliers -0.2 % 10.4 % 131
Size of the country:
0-2 million 2.1 % 26.8 % 76
2-10 million 5.8 % 19.1 % 59
10-50 million 14.9 % 27.9 % 54
50+ million -6.2 % 27.3 % 20
Continent:
Africa -3.7 % 23.3 % 51
Africa after eliminating 8 outliers -8.3 % 16.0 % 43
Asia -1.8 % 36.4 % 45
Asia after eliminating 6 outliers 2.3 % 9.1 % 39
Europe 4.2 % 6.6 % 46
South America 4.3 % 8.6 % 41
North America -6.3 % 6.3 % 5
Oceania -4.0 % 4.6 % 21
Source: our own computation by comparison of the projections obtained by the polynomial model with the UN
estimation for 2000. MPE and MAPE are weighted by population size in 2000. Outliers are deﬁned here as
countries for which the projection of urban population was more than 1.5 times less or more than the estimation for
the year 2000.
￿Countries 0% or 100% over the projection period are excluded from the computation.
4Part of this difference might be attributed to the choice of countries: Cohen used 169 countries “whose
boundaries have not change substantially” over the period while we used the whole UN data set on 209
countries (there are 228 countries in the UN database but 19 were or became totally urban or totally rural
over the period).
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The ﬁt is actually better for MDC (MPE = 0.4%, MAPE = 6.0%) than for LDC (MPE
= -1.5%, MAPE = 32.1%). The error in the projection is attributed mainly to some LDC.
Removing 24 outliers (including China and Indonesia, two big outliers) from the compu-
tation improvesconsiderablythe ﬁt for LDC (MPE = -0.2%, MAPE = 10.4%). Africa and
Asia show much higher variations (MAPE = 23.3% and 36.4% respectively) than other
parts of the world (MAPE varying from 4.6% to 8.6%). Here again removing outliers
improves the projections a lot (reducing the MAPE to 16.0% and 9.1% respectively for
Africa and Asia). This is an indication that the quality of the data on urbanisation greatly
affects the precision of the projections, a conclusion that convergeswith Cohen’s analysis
of the bias in UN projections (Cohen 2004, p47).
The performance of the UN model over the past period 1980-2000, as measured by
Cohen, is compared in Table 3 to the MPD measuring the difference between the UN
projections and the polynomial projections for the 1995-2015 period. The Table 2 con-
tains the detailed MPD by region of the world while the Table 3 compares the MPE and
the MPD by country size for the 20-year projection period. Note that Cohen computed
the MPE using the 2000 estimates from the 2001 UN report, nicknamed “ ’actual’ data”
in his paper, which are not totally based on country data since not all countries had data
available for this date. Even the 2003 UN report considers the 1995 data to be mostly
based on country data whereas the 2000 estimates are said to be a mix of estimates and
projections. Thereforefor our computationof MPD, we consideredthe UN projections to
be based on data up to 1995: the 20-yearprojection is for 2015 and the 35 year projection
is for 2030. The 20-year projection period seems more reasonable to compare Cohen’s
MPE and our own measure of MPD as the bias in measuring MPE will be minored by the
difference due to the UN projection method.
The MPE is closer to zero in the polynomial projections(-1.1%, see Table 1) than it is
in the UN projections(14.1%,see Table 3). Thepolynomialmodelwouldhave performed
much better on average than the UN model over the same period and using almost 5 the
same data. Also, the polynomialprojections do not appear so biased for the LDC (MPE =
-1.4%),contraryto the UN projections,which are higherin low income countries(MPE =
23.1%), and in lower middle income countries (MPE = 6.9%, but 25.6% when excluding
China) and in upper middle income countries (MPE = 12.8%), compared to ‘only’ 6% in
high income countries (Cohen 2004, Table 4)6.
If the polynomial model better ﬁts the historical trend than the UN model, then the
MPE for the past and MPD for the future should have comparable values, though the
projections started from lower level of urbanisation in the case of MPE. The distribution
ofMPE andMPD are indeedstrikinglysimilar forthe20-yearprojectionperiod(Table3).
5See note 4
6Cohen’s results are not computed for each continent or region as deﬁned in the UN report.
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Table 2: Bias of UN model as measured by the Mean Percentage Difference
(MPD) between the UN projections and the polynomial projections of
urban population
Major area, region, country or area 2000 2015 2030
WORLD 2.2 % 14.9 % 34.5 %
WORLD excluding China 2.7 % 18.4 % 42.0 %
More developed regions 1.3 % 5.0 % 10.5 %
Less developed regions 2.6 % 23.2 % 51.0 %
Less developed regions excluding China 3.3 % 22.6 % 50.7 %
AFRICA 9.1 % 28.5 % 52.6 %
Eastern Africa 17.3 % 49.4 % 81.6 %
Middle Africa 6.9 % 33.2 % 66.0 %
Northern Africa 7.3 % 19.2 % 36.8 %
Southern Africa -0.2 % 14.0 % 29.0 %
Western Africa 4.4 % 12.8 % 28.0 %
ASIA 1.6 % 23.0 % 55.6 %
ASIA excluding China 1.3 % 11.1 % 33.7 %
Eastern Asia 0.4 % 22.1 % 46.4 %
Eastern Asia excluding China -0.7 % 1.2 % 7.7 %
South-central Asia 1.0 % 11.7 % 38.7 %
South-eastern Asia 3.2 % 14.9 % 33.4 %
Western Africa 0.1 % 5.5 % 16.9 %
EUROPE 0.0 % 2.5 % 8.0 %
Eastern Europe -0.6 % 0.9 % 7.0 %
Northern Europe 0.0 % 2.2 % 5.6 %
Southern Europe 0.5 % 5.5 % 14.6 %
Western Europe 0.7 % 2.9 % 5.7 %
LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN 0.9 % 2.8 % 4.9 %
Caribbean 7.1 % 15.2 % 26.4 %
Central America 1.1 % 4.8 % 11.3 %
South America 0.2 % 0.7 % 0.2 %
NORTHERN AMERICA 4.8 % 10.8 % 15.2 %
OCEANIA 1.3 % 7.1 % 20.4 %
Australia/New Zealand 1.4 % 4.6 % 5.4 %
Melanesia 1.0 % 13.7 % 56.5 %
Micronesia 3.5 % 16.4 % 27.8 %
Polynesia -0.8 % 3.2 % 22.0 %
Less Developed Oceania 1.0 % 13.2 % 52.7 %
Source: our own computation by comparison of the UN projections and the polynomial regression model. MPD is
weighted by projected population size.
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Table 3: Bias of UN projections as measured by the Mean Percentage Error
(MPE) and the Mean Percentage Difference (MPD) in urban population
projections
MPE MPD MPD
Major Area or region 1980-2000 1995-2015 1995-2030
(20-year projection) (20-year projection) (35-year projection)
WORLD 14.1 % 14.9 % 34.5 %
WORLD exluding China 19.0 % 18.4 % 42.0 %
Size of the country:
0-2 million 7.4 % 10.4 % 33.8 %
2-10 million 12.0 % 11.8 % 22.0 %
10-50 million 21.6 % 22.3 % 42.2 %
50+ million 12.4 % 13.1 % 33.4 %
50+ million exluding China 18.9 % 17.7 % 43.5 %
Source MPE: Table 4, Cohen (2004). 20 years: comparison of projection in 1991 UN report with estimates for 2000
as per 2001 UN report (169 countries).
Source MPD: our own computation by comparison of the projections obtained by the UN model and by the
polynomial regression model (228 countries).
MPE is weighted by population size in 2000 whereas MPD is weighted by projected population size.
The overestimation of the urban population by the UN over the 1980-2000 period seems
to replicate almost identically for the 1995-2015 period, for all country size, and looks
worsewhen we excludeChina. The differencebetweenthe UN modelandthe polynomial
model is very high for the whole of Africa and for Eastern Africa and Middle Africa in
particular. The difference is also substantial in Eastern Asia (mainly because of China),
in South-Central Asia and South-Eastern Asia, as well as in the Caribbean, Melanesia
and Micronesia. All these regions are notoriously less developed, but the difference is
also observed for more developed regions such as Northern America. The fact that the
analysisofthebias ofUN projectiontallies verycloselywith theanalysis ofthedifference
between the UN projection and our own projection seems to indicate that the polynomial
model is well suited for projecting the historical urban trends. But of course, only the
future will tell if our projections were right.
Table4givessummarymeasuresofurbanisationatthe2030horizonusingtheUNand
the polynomial model. The proportion urban would be 49.2% in the latter against 60.8%
intheformer,adifferenceof11.6percentagepoints. Inabsoluteterm,thedifferenceinthe
projectedurbanpopulationis 947million. Developingcountriesaccountfor90.3%ofthis
difference,Asia alone for69.9%and Africa for19.2%. Some Asian countriesparticularly
contributeto the differencebetween the two estimations (detailedresults not shown here):
China (31.7%), India (22.4%), as well as other countries of the Indian sub-continent like
Bangladesh (3.8%) and Pakistan (3.0%), and also Indonesia (3.1%). Among developed
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countries, United States of America are the main contributorto the differencein the world
estimation (4.5%).
Obviously any projection will be sensitive to the estimation in these countries, which
are also among the most populous in the world. Because they concentrate a large share of
the world population,China (1.28 billion inhabitants in 2000, 1.45 projected in 2030) and
India(1.02billion in 2000,1.42in 2030)are of particularconcernregardingurbanization.
In the case of China, the Cultural Revolution led to a sharp slow-down in the late 1960s
followed by a sharp rise in the urban growth in the late 1970s (Liang 2001). However
our projections, which discarded the data prior to 1970, predict that the urban growth
should start to decline at the end of the 20th century and that the proportion urban in
China should stabilize at less than 40% from 2030. This departs largely from the UN
projectionspredictingﬁguresof 35.8%in 2000and60.5%in 2030,as illustratedin Figure
6. In our projection, the stabilization of the proportion urban at what would seem a low
level is partly due to the deﬁnition of urban areas. China is using a very high threshold
(100,000 inhabitants) combined with population density criteria together with a complex
functionalist deﬁnition of smaller urban agglomeration using various criteria (majority
of non-agriculture activities, percentage use of water, industrial output, GDP, etc.). To
add on the difﬁculty, these criteria evolved signiﬁcantly since the 1980s (Zhu 2003). The
UN series up to 1995 seems to be consistent with the 1990 deﬁnition. The last, more
internationally accepted change of deﬁnition was implemented in 2000 with the effect
of increasing by about 6 points the level of urbanization, estimated at 36.1% in 2000, as
compared to 30.9% in 1999. Using an even more standard deﬁnition of urban areas (e.g.
agglomerations of 10,000 inhabitants or more) would obviously lead to a much higher
level of urbanization,maybe adding up 10 percentage points to the ﬁgures published with
the 1990 deﬁnition, which would make China 50% urban by the year 2030 according to
our projection trends (instead of 40% using the 1990 deﬁnition).
One has to bear in mind that both UN and polynomial projections are made according
to the deﬁnition used in each country. The projectionsare then not strictly comparablefor
all countries. Part of the overestimation by the UN projections originates in applying a
regression model on urbanization data that are not based on a standard deﬁnition of urban
areas. By so doing, the UN regression model is imposing an average deﬁnition of urban
areas on all countries. Applying this model on China can only lead to overestimation
in the projection period, whatever the historical trend of this country, simply because its
urban deﬁnition makes the estimation in China for the 1950-1995 period lower than the
world average. Our polynomial model, because it is country-speciﬁc, controls for the
between-countries deﬁnitional problem. In the case of China, our projections follow the
1990 deﬁnition. At an aggregated level (for Eastern Asia and for the whole world), the
estimation of urban populationwill be pulled downwardby China with this old deﬁnition.
One would need computingthe series with the new 2000 deﬁnition to get better historical
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Table 4: Comparison of the UN model and the polynomial model (P) for
urbanisation projections at the 2030 horizon
Relative Absolute Percentage Urban-Rural
Major area Proportion Urban Difference Difference Difference Growth
in Urban in Urban in Urban Difference
UN P P-UN Population Population Population (2025-2030)
UN P
World 60.8 % 49.2 % -11.6 % -19.1 % -946,841 100.0 % 2.08 % 0.13 %
More developed regions 81.7 % 74.3 % -7.4 % -9.1 % -92,123 9.7 % 1.93 % 0.16 %
Less developed regions 57.1 % 44.6 % -12.4 % -21.7 % -854,718 90.3 % 2.32 % 0.29 %
AFRICA 53.5 % 40.5 % -13.0 % -24.3 % -181,432 19.2 % 2.31 % 0.45 %
Eastern Africa 41.0 % 27.2 % -13.7 % -33.5 % -63,456 6.7 % 2.52 % 0.85 %
Middle Africa 54.4 % 34.1 % -20.3 % -37.4 % -38,860 4.1 % 2.80 % -0.02 %
Northern Africa 63.4 % 50.5 % -12.8 % -20.2 % -34,272 3.6 % 2.43 % 0.33%
Southern Africa 67.0 % 52.3 % -14.7 % -21.9 % -7,149 0.8 % 2.23 % 0.09 %
West Africa 58.9 % 50.1 % -8.8 % -14.9 % -37,695 4.0 % 2.41 % 0.83 %
ASIA 54.5 % 41.0 % -13.5 % -24.9 % -662,080 69.9 % 2.49 % 0.20 %
Eastern Asia 62.6 % 44.0 % -18.7 % -29.8 % -309,725 32.7 % 2.58 % 0.00 %
South-central Asia 43.7 % 32.8 % -11.0 % -25.1 % -240,483 25.4 % 2.93 % 0.35 %
South-eastern Asia 60.7 % 48.5 % -12.2 % -20.2 % -87,108 9.2 % 2.56 % 0.54 %
Western Asia 72.3 % 64.7 % -7.7 % -10.6 % -24,764 2.6 % 1.58 % -0.17 %
EUROPE 79.6 % 74.3 % -5.3 % -6.6 % -36,182 3.8 % 1.84 % 0.21 %
Eastern Europe 74.3 % 69.6 % -4.7 % -6.3 % -12,145 1.3 % 1.69 % 0.01 %
Northern Europe 87.7 % 83.5% -4.3 % -4.9 % -4,260 0.4 % 1.71 % 0.11 %
Southern Europe 74.1 % 65.4 % -8.7 % -11.7 % -12,026 1.3 % 2.03 % 0.01 %
Western Europe 86.4 % 82.3 % -4.1 % -4.7 % -7,752 0.8 % 1.68 % 0.43 %
LATIN AMERICA
and CARIBBEAN 84.6 % 82.1 % -2.0 % -3.0 % -17,976 1.9 % 1.67 % 1.08 %
Caribbean 73.3 % 60.4 % -12.9 % -17.6 % -5,857 0.6 % 1.87 % -0.06 %
Central America 77.5 % 70.9 % -6.6 % -8.5 % -12,730 1.3 % 1.82 % 0.21 %
South America 88.6 % 88.8 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 611 -0.1 % 1.60 % 2.13 %
NORTHERN AMERICA 86.9 % 75.4 % -11.4 % -13.2 % -46,611 4.9 % 1.70 % -0.01 %
OCEANIA 74.9 % 68.7 % -6.2 % -8.2 % -2,560 0.3 % 0.48 % -0.50 %
Australia/New Zealand 94.9 % 90.0 % -4.9 % -5.1 % -1,375 0.1 % 1.45 % 0.35 %
Melanesia 27.2 % 18.2 % -9.0 % -33.2 % -1,046 0.1 % 2.65 % -0.24 %
Micronesia 81.2 % 70.0 % -11.2 % -13.8 % -84 0.0 % 1.85 % 0.09 %
Polynesia 55.0 % 48.4 % -6.5 % -11.9 % -55 0.0 % 2.36 % 0.34 %
Less Developed Oceania 32.0 % 23.0 % -9.0 % -28.1 % -1,184 0.1 % 2.27 % -0.18 %
Source: our own computation by comparison of the UN projections and the polynomial regression model. MPD is
weighted by projected population size.
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estimates and projections for China and Asia as a whole.
We don’t expect the same deﬁnitional problem with India because this country uses
a much lower threshold (5,000 inhabitants), together with a functionalist approach (ad-
ministrative centers, non-agricultural activities). According to our projections (illustrated
in Figure 6), the level of urbanization in India would hardly reach 31% in 2030. This
compares with 41.4% in the UN projection for 2030 but with persistent growth after this
date. Here the difference in estimation is mainly attributed to the difference in modeling.
If the polynomial model proved right, the majority of the developing world would not
live in urban areas by 2030. The populationwould stay predominantlyrural in Africa and
in Asia (Table 4). Even more importantly, the potential for future urban growth is very
much reduced in the projections based on the polynomial model. As an indication of this
potential, the urban-rural growth difference (
r
u
r) for the period 2025-2030 is reported
in Table 4. In the UN projections the
r
u
r ranges in each region between 1.5% and 3%
whereas in the polynomial projections the
r
u
r hovers around 0% and exceeds 2% only
in South America, while it is sometimes negative (as in Western Asia and Melanesia),
indicating reverse urbanisation.
The UN methodology used for projection inevitably forecasts that the proportion ur-
ban would one day reach 100%. On the contrary, the polynomial model indicates that
urban saturation could be attained not long after 2030. Therefore, there is a huge dis-
crepancy between the UN projections and our projections based on the historical patterns
of urban transition. According to the polynomial model, very few countries would still
have in 2030 a high potential for urban growth. The Table 5 indicates the most populous




(morethan0.5%a yearin the2025-2030period). Qualityoftheprojectionsnotwithstand-
ing(six ofthemweresubjectedto specialcorrectionsbeforeprojections,see Appendix2),
those large, mostly developing countries7 representing 18.8% of the world population in




r of only 0.26% a year would account for 12.3% of the world urban pop-
ulation increase. To summarize, ten developing countries would contribute to more than
half of the world urbanpopulationincrease in the 2025-2030period. Many of the remain-
ing countries would have reached their urban saturation level, contributing marginally to
the world urban growth after 2030.
5. Conclusions: improving projection models
It is clear from our analysis that the UN projections are biased and lead to a gross over-
estimation of urbanization trends. Contrary to the common belief, the UN projections are
7Germany is an exception, but its contribution to the world urban population increase is marginal.
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Table 5: Ten largest countries (
>50 million) still having a high urban growth
potential (
>0.5%) in the 2025-2030period according to the polynomial
model projections
Projected Projected Urban-Rural Additional
Country population Proportion Growth urban
in 2030 Urban Difference population
(’000) in 2030 2025-2030 2025-2030
Indonesia
4 227,567 57.2 % 1.02 % 7,630
Pakistan
1 271,600 39.3 % 0.78 % 10,906
Brazil 222,078 92.3 % 3.44 % 8,126
Nigeria
1 206,696 63.7 % 1.71 % 13,117
Mexico 133,591 79.2 % 0.53 % 3,519
Ethiopia 127,220 24.8 % 2.10 % 4,995
Islamic Republic of Iran
3 94,441 76.6 % 2.40 % 4,710
Germany
3 81,511 92.2 % 1.71 % 110
Colombia
1 60,843 91.7 % 5.96 % 3,952
Republic of Korea 50,042 90.2 % 0.85 % 79
Total 10 countries 1,525,588 - - 57,144
China 1,450,521 39.8 % 0.02 % 2,554
India 1,416,576 30.9 % 0.26 % 18,432
World 8,130,149 49.2 % 0.13 % 149,974
Note: Countries subjected to corrections in the polynomial model are indicated by their correction score: 1 (mild
correction), 3 (high correction), 4 (very high correction). The projections for those countries are therefore to be
cautiously interpreted.
not based on the extrapolation of historical trends. We proved that this can be attributed
mainlytoan inappropriateprojectionmodelthat systematicallybiases the urbanestimates
upward, and also to the quality of the available data. The fairly simple polynomial model
that we propose here as an alternative captures most of the historical trends (as reported
by the UN) and projects them well in the future, country by country. We hope that the
results presentedhere will extendthe debate and that other models will be proposedto the
users of world urban population projections. In particular, we should compare the results
of the projections using the UN data with the multiregional projections obtained using
more complex models (Rogers 1995) capable of offering better results albeit with more
detailed data. Meanwhile, the polynomial model of urban transition has limitations that
should be taken into account to reﬁne the projections:
￿ Our projections are based on the World Urbanization Prospects published by the
UN, with estimates of the urbanand total populationby 5-year intervals from 1950.
In reality, censuses are not always available from that date and are rarely conducted
every ﬁve years and our model is therefore partly based on interpolations. It would
be better to use – and not more difﬁcult to implement – the original estimation
points from census data or other sources.
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￿ Results show that the information on urbanisation is better used at a country level
than at a sub-regionallevel or continental level. An improvementwould be to work
at a sub-country level for such countries as China, India, etc., where there are huge
discrepancies between provinces or States.
￿ Particular effort should be devotedat ﬁnding better estimations for the countries for
which we had to make speciﬁc corrections. In these countries the problem is more
with the data that form the base for projection than with the model itself.
￿ International comparisons become difﬁcult when countries are using very different
urban deﬁnitions. Coordination is needed to evaluate the population in urban areas
according to an internationally recognised deﬁnition. An alternative to the projec-
tion of the overall urbanpopulationwould be the projectionof the urbanpopulation
above high thresholds (e.g. agglomerations of more than 20,000, 50,000, 100,000
or 500,000 inhabitants) that could easily be computed using a list of towns and
cities ranked by size in each country. A model relating the estimates obtained at
each thresholdcouldthen be used to evaluate a standardurbanisationrate at a lower
threshold (e.g. 10,000 inhabitants).
Toimprovetheprojections,it ishoweverclearthattheavailabledataset is notsatisfac-
tory. As earlier recommended by an international panel of scientists (National Research
Council2003),consideringthe importanceofurbanprojectionsfordemographersand ge-
ographers, and also for other scientists and policy makers, the UN’s Population Division
would give everyone a great service in making the original data set available to the public
so that projections and data from each country are put under the scrutiny they deserve by
the scientiﬁc community.
Whatever the alternative model based on historical trends, the expected results will
changethe perceptionthat we haveofurbanisationandof its relationto development. The
urban population could be as much as one billion less than expected and the world might
not, after all, become predominantly urban. From our projections, it would appear that in
a foreseeable future the level of urbanisation will probably be much more heterogeneous
than previously thought. Whether this is good or bad news depends on the perspective
than one has on development. If the correlation between on one hand urbanisation and
on the other hand GDP, HDI, poverty index or other social and economic development
indicators is conﬁrmed, then the tentative urban projections presented here reﬂect the
persistence of poverty and of great economic inequalities over the world. Our projections
also call for the revision of the projection of the global population as the reduction of
mortality and fertility – the speed of the demographic transition is often attributed to the
inﬂuence of the urban way of life – might not be so important. The projections of urban
population have great consequences on environmental policies too. In a less urbanised
world, the developed countries would still be responsible for most of the greenhouse gas
emission while most of the natural resources would remain in the developing world.
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Appendix I
The relation between the Urban-Rural Growth Difference (
r
u
r) and the Excess In-
crease in Urban Areas (
x
u)
AndreiRogers (1995)noted that the urban-ruralgrowthdifferencecan be expressedusing


















































































































M stand respectively for the natural and the migration increase.




































































































































8For convenience of demonstration, we will consider a one-year interval. The demonstration can easily be
extended to ﬁve-year intervals.
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In this last expression of
r
u
r, one notices that apart from the natural and migration in-
creases, the right-hand side of the equation makes a repeated use of the population urban
and rural known from the preceding period
t
￿
1. It is actually possible to simplify the
























































































































































































) is simply the theoretical natural increase in
urban areas if urban areas were to grow at the same natural rate than the total population,







































































= excess natural increase in
U
+ excess migration increase in
U
The left-hand side of equation (3) now contains only known quantities based on the
population estimates in urban and rural areas, whereas the right – hand side now contains
unknown (to the urbanisation database) quantities – natural and migration balances.
We canverifythattheleft-handsideofequation(3)representswelltheexcessincrease
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t the hypothetical absolute
increase in urban areas if the urban areas where to grow at the same rate as the total
population.
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900 WORLD 228 6 070 581 19 8,3% 13 463 0,2% 64 28.1% 2 625 147 43,2% 12,4% 1950 1995 6
901 More developed regions 55 1 193 872 5 9,1% 168 0,0% 7 12.7% 123 945 10,4% 8,5% 1950 2000 0
902 Less developed regions 173 4 876 709 14 8,1% 13 295 0,3% 57 32.9% 2 501 202 51,3% 13,4% 1950 1995 6
903 AFRICA 56 795 671 2 3,6% 1 389 0,2% 20 35.7% 347 915 43,7% 29,1% 1950 1995 3
910 Eastern Africa 18 252 515 2 11,1% 1 389 0,5% 5 27.8% 90 111 35,7% 25,9% 1950 1993 1
174 Comoros 705 1 705 1970 1995 0 1
404 Kenya 30 549 1 30 549 1950 1990 1 4
454 Malawi 11 370 1 11 370 1980 2000 0 2
834 Tanzania 34 837 1 34 837 1950 1990 0 3
(United Rep. of)
716 Zimbabwe 12 650 1 12 650 1970 1995 0 1
911 Middle Africa 9 92 960 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 3 33.3% 14 100 15,2% 0,5% 1950 1990 0
24 Angola 12 386 1 12 386 1950 1980 0 2
226 Equatorial Guinea 456 1 456 1950 1985 0 3
266 Gabon 1 258 1 1 258 1965 1995 0 1
912 Northern Africa 7 173 615 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 2 28.6% 30 530 17,6% 0,0% 1950 1995 0
12 Algeria 30 245 1 30 245 1970 2000 0 1
732 Western Sahara 285 1 285 1970 1995 0 1
913 Southern Africa 5 50 448 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 3 60.0% 47 619 94,4% 3,8% 1960 2000 0
72 Botswana 1 725 1 1 725 1975 2000 0 2
516 Namibia 1 894 1 1 894 1960 1990 0 4
710 South Africa 44 000 1 44 000 1965 2000 0 1
914 Western Africa 17 226 133 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 7 41.2% 165 556 73,2% 72,4% 1950 1995 2
132 Cape Verde 436 1 436 1970 1990 0 1
288 Ghana 19 593 1 19 593 1950 1985 0 3
324 Guinea 8 117 1 8 117 1960 1995 0 4
624 Guinea-Bissau 1 367 1 1 367 1965 1995 0 1
466 Mali 11 904 1 11 904 1970 1985 0 4
566 Nigeria 114 746 1 114 746 1965 1990 1 1
686 Senegal 9 393 1 9 393 1970 2000 1 5

































































































































































































































































































900 WORLD 228 6 070 581 19 8,3% 13 463 0,2% 64 28.1% 2 625 147 43,2% 12,4% 1950 1995 6
901 More developed regions 55 1 193 872 5 9,1% 168 0,0% 7 12.7% 123 945 10,4% 8,5% 1950 2000 0
902 Less developed regions 173 4 876 709 14 8,1% 13 295 0,3% 57 32.9% 2 501 202 51,3% 13,4% 1950 1995 6
935 ASIA 50 3 679 737 3 6,0% 11 273 0,3% 20 40.0% 2 042 001 55,5% 9,6% 1950 1995 0
0 Asia without China 49 2 404 522 3 6,1% 11 273 0,5% 19 38.8% 766 786 31,9% 14,8% 1950 1995 0
906 Eastern Asia 7 1 481 110 2 28,6% 7 257 0,5% 1 14.3% 1 275 215 86,1% 0,0% 1950 2000 0
0 Eastern Asia w/o China 6 205 895 2 33,3% 7 257 3,5% 0 0.0% 0 0,0% 0,0% 1950 2000 0
156 China 1 275 215 1 1 275 215 1970 2000 0 1
921 South-central Asia 14 1 486 049 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 6 42.9% 245 410 16,5% 6,6% 1950 1995 0
64 Bhutan 2 063 1 2 063 1950 1970 0 4
364 Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 66 443 1 66 443 1950 1990 0 3
524 Nepal 23 518 1 23 518 1950 1990 0 3
586 Pakistan 142 654 1 142 654 1960 2000 0 1
762 Tajikistan 6 089 1 6 089 1970 1985 0 5
795 Turkmenistan 4 643 1 4 643 1970 1995 0 1
920 South-eastern Asia 11 520 355 1 9,1% 4 016 0,8% 6 54.5% 402 257 77,3% 45,1% 1960 1995 0
116 Cambodia 13 147 1 13 147 1985 2000 0 1
626 Timor-Este 702 1 702 1960 1990 0 1
(Dem. Rep.)
360 Indonesia 211 559 1 211 559 1965 1995 0 4
458 Malaysia 23 001 1 23 001 1965 1990 0 4
608 Philippines 75 711 1 75 711 1965 2000 0 1
704 Viet Nam 78 137 1 78 137 1975 2000 0 2
922 Western Asia 18 192 222 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 7 38.9% 119 119 62,0% 11,5% 1950 1995 0
196 Cyprus 783 1 783 1960 1995 0 1
400 Jordan 5 035 1 5 035 1965 2000 0 1
414 Kuwait 2 247 1 2 247 1965 1995 0 1
512 Oman 2 609 1 2 609 1965 1995 0 1
682 Saudi Arabia 22 147 1 22 147 1950 1980 0 4
792 Turkey 68 281 1 68 281 1970 2000 0 1
887 Yemen 18 017 1 18 017 1975 1995 0 2

































































































































































































































































































900 WORLD 228 6 070 581 19 8,3% 13 463 0,2% 64 28.1% 2 625 147 43,2% 12,4% 1950 1995 6
901 More developed regions 55 1 193 872 5 9,1% 168 0,0% 7 12.7% 123 945 10,4% 8,5% 1950 2000 0
902 Less developed regions 173 4 876 709 14 8,1% 13 295 0,3% 57 32.9% 2 501 202 51,3% 13,4% 1950 1995 6
908 EUROPE 47 727 986 4 8,5% 88 0,0% 7 14.9% 123 945 17,0% 13,9% 1950 2000 0
923 Eastern Europe 10 304 538 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 1 10.0% 22 480 7,4% 0,0% 1950 2000 0
642 Romania 22 480 1 22 480 1970 2000 0 1
924 Northern Europe 13 94 123 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 1 7,7% 74 0,1% 0,0% 1950 2000 0
833 Isle of Man 74 17 4 1965 1990 0 1
925 Southern Europe 15 145 822 3 20,0% 55 0,0% 2 13,3% 3 179 2,2% 2,1% 1950 2000 0
8 Albania 3 113 1 3 113 1960 1985 0 4
20 Andorra 66 16 6 1970 2000 0 1
926 Western Europe 9 183 502 1 11,1% 33 0,0% 3 33,3% 98 212 53,5% 53,5% 1950 2000 0
276 Germany 82 282 1 82 282 1950 1985 0 3
438 Liechtenstein 33 13 3 1980 2000 0 4
528 Netherlands 15 898 1 15 898 1960 1995 0 4
904 LATIN AMERICA / 46 520 229 5 10,9% 605 0,1% 12 26.1% 110 246 21,2% 13,1% 1950 1995 3
CARIBBEAN
915 Caribbean 24 37 673 5 20,8% 605 1,6% 6 25.0% 10 076 26,7% 22,2% 1950 1995 2
533 Aruba 93 19 3 1950 1985 1 3
44 Bahamas 303 1 303 1970 1990 0 1
52 Barbados 267 1 267 1950 1990 1 0
332 Haiti 8 005 1 8 005 1950 1980 0 4
670 Saint Vincent 118 1 118 1975 1995 0 2
& Grenadines
780 Trinidad & Tobago 1 289 1 1 289 1970 1990 0 1
916 Central America 8 135 213 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 2 25.0% 17 631 13,0% 13,0% 1950 1998 0
222 El Salvador 6 209 1 6 209 1950 1990 0 3
320 Guatemala 11 423 1 11 423 1950 1985 0 3
931 South America 14 347 343 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 4 28.6% 82 539 23,8% 12,1% 1950 2000 1
32 Argentina 37 074 1 37 074 1965 2000 0 1
170 Colombia 42 120 1 42 120 1950 2000 1 1
238 Falkland Islands 3 13 1970 1995 0 1
(Malvinas)
858 Uruguay 3 342 1 3 342 1980 2000 0 2

































































































































































































































































































900 WORLD 228 6 070 581 19 8,3% 13 463 0,2% 64 28.1% 2 625 147 43,2% 12,4% 1950 1995 6
901 More developed regions 55 1 193 872 5 9,1% 168 0,0% 7 12.7% 123 945 10,4% 8,5% 1950 2000 0
902 Less developed regions 173 4 876 709 14 8,1% 13 295 0,3% 57 32.9% 2 501 202 51,3% 13,4% 1950 1995 6
905 NORTHERN AMERICA 5 315 915 1 20,0% 80 0,0% 0 0.0% 0 0,0% 0,0% 1950 2000 0
909 OCEANIA 24 31 043 4 16,7% 28 0,1% 5 20.8% 1 040 3,3% 0,0% 1950 2000 0
927 Australia/New Zealand 2 22 937 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0.0% 0 0,0% 0,0% 1950 2003 0
928 Melanesia 5 6 996 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 1 20.0% 814 11,6% 0,0% 1950 2000 0
242 Fiji 814 1 814 1975 2000 0 2
954 Micronesia 7 499 1 14,3% 12 2,4% 2 28.6% 158 31,7% 0,0% 1950 1995 0
584 Marshall Islands 51 15 1 1980 2000 0 2
583 Micronesia 107 1 107 1970 1995 0 1
(Fed. States of)
957 Polynesia 10 611 3 30,0% 16 2,6% 2 20.0% 68 11,1% 0,0% 1950 2000 0
16 American Samoa 58 15 8 1970 1990 0 1
798 Tuvalu 10 11 0 1980 1995 0 2
Notes: Countries 0% urban from 1950 are: Pitcairn (population
<100 inhabitants), Tokelau (
<1500), Wallis and
Futuna Islands (
<14500). Countries 100% urban in 1995 or before are: Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, Gibraltar,
Holy See (Vatican), Monaco, Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Nauru. Countries reaching 100% after 1995 are:
Djibouti (2005), La Runion (2030), Gabon (2025), Guadeloupe (2005), Cook Islands (2025). Only the 64 countries
for which a correction was made are listed above. Correction scores are: 1 for mild (removal of estimates
<1970
for 30 countries), 2 for average (removal of estimates
<1980 for 10 countries), 3 for high (removal of estimates
>1985 for 9 countries), 4 very high (removal of estimates
>1980 for Bhutan and Liechtenstein, or combination of 1
and 3, for 10 other countries), 5 for severe (removal of estimates
<1970 and removal of estimates
>1985 for
Senegal and Tajikistan). In addition, speciﬁc corrections were conducted for some countries. For Colombia, the
estimates for 1980 and 1985 were not used for the regression. For Kenya, the UN estimates for 1985 and 1990
were replaced by our own estimates based on the published 1979 and 1989 Census results. For Senegal, the UN
estimates for 1990 to 2000 were replaced by our own estimates based on the published 1987 and 2002 Census
results. For Aruba, a simple regression model (without
P
U




instead of the regression on
x
u. The author failed to ﬁnd any speciﬁc corrections for the Barbados, where the 1990
proportion urban was simply replicated to subsequent dates.
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